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Benefits from ecosystem services derived from grasslands

Fairness and efficiency: a challenge for payment for
environmental services in Asia1
Beria Leimona
World Agroforestry Centre, Southeast Asia
Contact email: LBeria@cgiar.org

Abstract. Payment for environmental service (PES) is commonly defined as a market-based environmental
policy instrument to efficiently achieve environmental protection. However, an increasing body of literature
shows that the prescriptive conceptualization of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in
practice and the commoditization of ecosystem services is problematic and may be unfair. To investigate the
underlying causes, this study combined a quantitative and qualitative research approach using case studies in
Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal. The empirical observations on emerging PES-mechanisms in the Asian
case studies show that interdependency of fairness and efficiency should be the main consideration in
designing and implementing a PES scheme in developing countries.
Keywords: Market-based, environmental policy, ecosystem services, environmental protection.

Introduction
Asia’s landscape, where most of its inhabitants depend on
agriculture and natural resources for their livelihood, has an
immense diversity of land-cover mosaics. This region
offers many opportunities to explore interactions between
environmental services (ES) and land use practices by its
farmers. These farmers mostly act as land managers who
have a meagre living in the upper watershed and at the
forest boundary. These areas provide many valuable ES
and at the same time are mostly under severe threat of
degradation (MA 2005). Market imperfection and policy
distortion that neglect the social and economic importance
of ecosystems are claimed as root causes for environmental
problems in Asia (Tomich et al. 2004; TEEB 2010)
The principle of market-based instruments is applied
for capturing the financial value of ecosystem services
through monetization and commoditization of ecosystem
services (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010) of which payment
for environmental services (PES) is an important
component. Initial debates on PES focused on the quest of
enhancing economic efficiency of conservation and
enforcing markets to link supply and demand for ecosystem
services. The main reason for the application of marketbased instruments for ecosystem services is because the
real value of ecosystem services to human wellbeing is not,
or only partially included in market economics (De Groot
1992; Turner et al. 1994; Costanza et al. 1997). This
situation refers to market failures, i.e. the failure of markets
to reflect to full or true value of so-called free services such
as pure water (without the need for purification) or
pollination enhancing crop yields, and neglect to recognize
negative effects of economic activities on environmental

public goods (i.e. so called negative externalities). The
articulation of market forces in solving these negative
externalities aims to transfer external values to local
decision makers in providing such environmental services
at the lowest possible social cost.
Effective legal structures with well-defined and
enforceable policy rights can overcome the problems of
market failures associated with environmental externalities
(Coase 1960). Schemes with voluntary contracts as
opposed to strict command-and-control instruments may
better approximate social optimum and increase efficiency
in generating environmental goods and services.
A valid line of argument on PES exists among
scientists and practitioners that a PES instrument should not
be burdened by additional social equity goals in achieving
its environmental and cost-effectiveness goals of ES
provisions. The question is what environmental integrity
aspects can be segregated from social inequity issues?
Nevertheless, recent literature discussed that the Coasean
and pure market approach dominating the conceptualization
of PES cannot be easily generalized and implemented in
practice (Muradian et al. 2010).
Moreover, Kosoy and Corbera (2010) through the lens
of “commodity fetishism” argued the commoditization of
ecosystem services was problematic. Case studies in Latin
America showed social values beyond merely financial
payment induced participation in PES (Kosoy et al. 2007)
and monetization of environmental services was mostly
rejected by the PES recipients (Asquith et al. 2008).
However, potential combination between equity and
efficiency may be possible (Pascual et al. 2010). Thus,
there is a clear need to adjust Coarse’s argument and
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incorporate context and perspective of local stakeholders.
Especially, when PES schemes are applied in developing
countries with skewed wealth distribution, contested
property rights, low law enforcement and weak institutions
(Neef and Thomas 2009).
Supported by global agreements, the solution of
environmental problems in developing countries,
specifically in Asia have to emphasize dual goals of
poverty alleviation and environmental conservation
(Tinbergen 1976; UN 1992). Payment for Environmental
Services (PES) is one of the tools currently being tested and
practiced globally to help achieve these goals (Muradian et
al. 2010; Pascual et al. 2010; Van Noordwijk and Leimona
2010). The PES-concept was initially strictly defined as a
market-based environmental policy instrument to achieve
environmental protection in the most efficient way (Pagiola
et al. 2005; Engel et al. 2008). This is based on the
principle “you get what you pay” for positive effects on the
flow of environmental services (Wunder,2007). However,
recent literature discussed that the Coasean and pure market
approach dominating the conceptualization of PES cannot
be easily generalized and implemented in practice
(Muradian et al. 2010).
The conceptualization and analysis of PES in Asian
countries is still limitedly analyzed how to balance between
efficiency and fairness involved in changing current land
use, socio-cultural values and behaviour of relevant stakeholders. Based on empirical research in Indonesia, Philippines and Nepal, this study aims to test the overarching
hypothesis that without combining efficiency and fairness
aspects, the PES concept will not provide sustainable
solutions and its implementation may achieve neither an
increase of ES provision nor livelihood enhancement.
This paper presents an analysis of practical applications
of PES in Asian developing countries. It shows that in
order for PES to achieve its dual goals, the emphasis to
inclusion of both efficiency and fairness elements to all
actors involved is essential. This study briefly describes the
obstacles to, and conditions for, establishing PES in
developing country contexts. The research investigated the
need for broader categorization of PES conditionality and
perspectives to meet imperfect conditions for applying
strict ES market-based policies in developing countries.
Observed imperfect conditions are among others: insecure
property rights, high incidence of poverty, poor environmental governance, and high potential conflict in natural
resource management. This paper suggests some solutions
on how to design a pro-poor PES based on an analysis of
circumstances where PES can contribute to income
increment, observed preferred rewards and PES outcomes
to ES providers. The findings also include the application
of multiple ecological-knowledge to improve PES
efficiency and fairness.

The context of Asian landscape and people
In Asian rural areas, traditional land and resource management systems fail as population increases and
miniaturization of land leads to overuse. Skewed land
distribution often compels the poor to survive by
cultivating marginal land – erosion- prone slopes and other
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

environmental problems. Without tenure, and often with
only passing claims on the land they cultivate, the poor are
less likely to make investments to protect natural resources
(Brandon and Ramankutty 1993; Van Noordwijk et al.
2002). These socioeconomic conditions are apparent on
research areas of this study.
The pilot sites where the author coordinated and
conducted research for this study cover three countries
(Indonesia, the Philippines and Nepal) and nine sites
located in Southeast and South Asia (Fig. 1). Following the
analysis of Hadi and van Noordwijk (2005), some
combinations of agro ecological zones can be distinguished
from these sites for analyzing potential establishment of
rewards for environmental services (RES) through the
interaction of tree-based and more intensive agriculture or
urban land use system. For example, RES is potentially
operational for watershed functions in Sumatra – Indonesia,
Luzon and Mindanao – the Philippines, and some parts of
South Asia, where lowland rice is located at the
downstream of upland mosaic, forest, or tree-crop mixed,
or in some parts of South Asia, where ‘highland mixed’ is
located at the upstream of urbanized areas. Rewards for
biodiversity conservation can occur where tree-crop or
upland mosaic is located adjacent to forest threatened by
further expansions of intensive anthropocentric land use.
Furthermore, the sites are action and learning sites of
the Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services
(RUPES) project of World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)
Southeast Asia Region, which are the pioneers of RES
initiative in each of the three countries. Indonesia and the
Philippines were selected to represent the Southeast Asia
region, where natural resource management is growing in
practice (CGIAR, 2011) and where ICRAF’s “sentinel
landscapes” exist to provide collection of the long-term
data sets and to test models. Nepal was included as a case
study in South Asia, where collective action and social
movement are relatively advanced, especially in its upland
area. Figure 1 shows that analysis at local level was mostly
conducted in Indonesia, while the case studies in the
Philippines and Nepal provide lessons at the regional level.
Most of the sites focus on rewards for watershed
services under private and public schemes (Table 1). Two
of pilot sites (Singkarak, Indonesia and Kalahan, the
Philippines) are testing the voluntary carbon market and
one of the sites (Bungo, Indonesia) is seeking opportunities
for eco-certification scheme of rubber agroforestry. The
stages of implementations are also various, ranging from
initial development of RES, where the intermediary
partners are conducting scoping studies on biophysical and
socioeconomic aspects of the pilot, to mature schemes,
where contractual agreements have been signed and
schemes are ready to be scaled up.

Main findings
Broader categorization of conditionality of PES
emphasizes interdependency between fairness and
efficiency as opposed to a strict and prescriptive PES
definition
The current PES definition reflects the Coasean
1776
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Figure 1. Research sites in Asia with pilot-level research conducted in Indonesia.
Table 1. Research sites and the status of the applied ‘rewards for environmental service’ scheme.
Site
Indonesia
Singkarak, West
Sumatra

Started in
2002

Main ES
Watershed services
Carbon sequestration (voluntary)

Bungo, Jambi

2002

Sumberjaya, Lampung

2002

Cidanau, West Java

2001

Kapuas Hulu, West
Kalimatan
Talau, East Nusa
Tenggara
The Philippines
Bakun

2008

2004

Kalahan

2002

Nepal
Kulekhani

2002

2008

Agrobiodiversity conservation of
jungle rubber
Watershed services, mainly
sedimentation reduction
Watershed services for domestic
and industrial demands
Watershed services for a district
water company
Watershed services for a district
water company

Scheme
Distribution of royalty of a
parastatal hydroelectric power
(HEP) company
Financial payment from an
international carbon broker
Financial payment from a
philanthropic scheme
Eco-certification for jungle
rubber
‘Conditional CSR’ from a
parastatal HEP company
‘Conditional CSR’ from a water
company
Earmark payment from water bill
Earmark payment from water bill

Status
Ad-hoc share of royalty
Agreed 10 year contract in total
49 hectares
Ad-hoc reward of a micro hydro
Scoping elements for RES
development
Agreed 1 year contract and
scaled up to other sites
Agreed 5 year-contracts in xx
villages
Scoping elements for RES
development
Scoping elements for RES
development

Watershed services for private
HEPs
Carbon sequestration (voluntary)

Distribution of HEP’s royalty to
community
Financial payment from national
companies

Agreed share of royalty

Watershed services for a private
HEP

Distribution of HEP’s royalty to
community

Agreed share of royalty

conceptualization of PES i.e. efficiency gains may be
achieved independent of the allocation of property rights
(Bulte et al. 2008; Zilberman et al. 2008; Neef and Thomas
2009; Muradian et al. 2010). The concept also disregards
equity issues since the aggregate gains and losses by
different economic agents is more important than how they
are distributed in society (Pascual et al. 2010). The ideal
PES schemes based on environmental and cost efficiency
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

Initial negotiation with potential
buyers

principle should “integrate environmental services21into
markets, and should be like any other market transaction”
(Farley and Costanza 2010). Further, the inclusion of a
poverty alleviation goal might reduce economic efficiency
of the scheme (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder et al. 2008).
12

In their article, Farley and Costanza (2010) used the term
“ecosystem services” rather than “environmental services”.
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Practices in developing countries mostly rule out PES if
this definition is strictly applied as a market-based or
commoditized ES.
Our case studies proved that precondition for the
Coasean conceptualization of PES could not be met. The
reasons, among others, were lack of data and capability to
measure, map, model, value and monitor ecosystem
services at multiple scales; unclear property rights; lack of
sustainable funding; and close links between poverty and
environmental degradation. In addition to that, the Asian
cases mostly placed ES providers as more marginalized
community group with low formal education background
and lack of access to information and justice. Our result
aligned with the Heredia Declaration of Payments for
Ecosystem Services introduced by an article by Farley and
Costanza (2010). The article concluded that payment do not
require commodification, however, shared responsibility is
needed to provide and protect ecosystem services.
Analysis of global PES schemes as part of our study,
including our case studies showed that strict conditionality
of PES mostly did not exist. Therefore, we recognized that
in practice, conditionality of PES contracts is stratified
ranging from ES contracts that link tangible benefits for the
ES providers by the actual enhanced delivery of ES (level
I), maintenance of agro-ecosystems in a desirable state
(level II), performance agreed actions to enhance ES (level
III), development and implementation of management
plans to enhance ES with respect for local sovereignty in
conserving the environment for both local and external
benefits (level IV). This stratification contributes to
bringing the theory of PES conditionality closer to practice
(van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010).
Based on these levels of conditionality and recognition
of PES practices in Asia, we offer three distinct perspectives of PES. Those are commoditization of ES, compensation for opportunities skipped/forgone and co-investment
in environmental stewardship. Commoditization of ES
operates at conditionality level I with no explicit poverty
targets. Compensation for opportunities skipped/ forgone is
when land users are paid for accepting restrict-ions on their
use of land and has conditionality at level II or III. Coinvestment in environmental stewardship is where PES
contracts between ES providers and buyers are flexible
with broad sanction and monitoring requirements. Mutual
trust is strong.
Our case studies also observed that there are
opportunities for phased strategies. After creating, for
example, a basis of respect and relationship through the coinvestment paradigm, there may be more space for specific
follow-ups in the commoditization paradigm for actual
delivery of ES to meet conservation and ES additional
objectives, i.e. a PES scheme is additional whereas the
scheme increases environmental services compared to
baselines without a PES scheme.

In order to be pro-poor, a PES has to adapt to the
local conditions, including in designing types, forms
and expected level of rewards
The case studies of PES in Asia experienced shifting
perspectives: from legitimating cost-efficient and effective
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

natural resource management outcomes to concerns about
fairness in design and benefit distribution of the scheme.
Monetization and commoditization of ES through PES can
create technical problems in addressing both efficiency and
fairness outcomes; it also raises ethical arguments by
obscuring cultural, political and social relationships in an
environmental service generation (Kosoy and Corbera
2010).
We analyzed the contribution of actual cash for
individual ES providers from beneficiaries to poverty
alleviation and proved that such a design has to attentively
consider some key ratios of relative numbers of service
providers and beneficiaries, and their income per capita
measures (Leimona et al. 2009). In this case, the analysis of
income and spatial data on Indonesian agro-ecosystems
indicated that a modest increased target of 5% of annual
disposable income of upstream rural household may be
difficult to be achieved given the population and income
structure of downstream and upstream areas in Asia.
Identifying rewards that match with people’s needs and
expectations, is one particularly important aspect of propoor RES approaches. The findings from focus group
discussions at the different sites suggest that there is a
substantial variation among communities concerning
poverty concepts and reward preferences. This provides
important insights into the various dimensions that welltargeted reward schemes need to address. Our analysis
concluded that rewards in the forms of human capital,
social capital and physical capital – or what are often
referred to as non-financial incentives – are very often the
most preferred and possible types of rewards. Public social
investments, such as education and health services (i.e.
human capital), good road conditions (i.e. physical capital),
security of land tenure, recognition as environmental
champion and trust from government to maintain intact
environment (i.e. social capital). In industrialized country,
these public investment are part of government’s
responsibility, however they are lacking in our case studies.
These aspects combined with high social cohesion that
defies the concept of free-rider (i.e. we don’t mind our
neighbour enjoying our rewards from maintaining good ES
and we prefer everybody is happy) support the preference
of non-financial reward.

Initial investment in achieving a shared understanding of multiple ecological knowledge in providing and managing ES increases efficiency and
fairness of PES scheme
One of the main problems of a PES scheme is that there are
widely held assumptions between changes in land cover
and environmental service (ES) provision. The proposed
solutions of environmental problems, including decrease of
ES provisions, are mostly based on the relative merits of
reforestation emphasizing that ES is provided only by
natural forest but not by other land uses. Furthermore,
standardized solution to natural resource management
refers to narrowly defined land-rehabilitation projects by,
for example, planting trees and not considering other
landscape management techniques, such as constructing
simple sedimentation retainer along riparian zone.
1778
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In natural resource management, different stakeholders
may in fact have opposite interests in utilizing a landscape.
From the policy perspective, agroforestry-mosaic landscapes as found in many Asian countries, can offer great
opportunity for combining economic and environment
targets. In these landscapes, farmers combine elements of
the natural forest that provide environmental services with
trees for productive purposes and intensive food cropping
systems (Van Noordwijk et al. 2002). Yet, potential ES
buyers and policy makers in general sometimes fail
recognizing these agroforestry systems. As the agricultural
landscapes, for example, may not meet the legal definitions
of “forest” or be in conflict with the existing land-use
regulation system and policies – even though the land
practices can provide some ES at similar level to forest
ecosystems can.
The appreciation of the various quantitative environmental service indicators probably differs by stakeholder
group. To ensure an established PES, we need to understand these ES indicators from the perspective of both
upstream and downstream local communities, general
public and policy makers, and ecological modeller or
hydrologist – who are involved in a PES scheme (Farida et
al. 2005; Jeanes et al. 2006). The multiple ecological
knowledge approach applied in this study is to clarify
expectations from all relevant actors, avoid unrealistic
targets for the quality of watershed services, help define
conditionality of RES and offer appropriate monitoring
procedures. However, our case studies also showed that the
availability of information is only a prerequisite for
increasing the quality and sustainability of PES schemes.
Interviews with practitioners in this study found that the
factors influencing the design and implementation of PES
programs are varied and beyond the availability of multiperception knowledge and scientific data. The issue of
strategic use of information, a discrepancy between scale in
the provision of environmental services and its investment,
and the vested interests of intermediaries and donors deter
the optimal use of such multiple knowledge analysis in
designing and implementing rewards for watershed
schemes.

A sustainable livelihood framework enables broader
analysis of local perspectives on PES by encompassing various types of capitals
Poverty, defined simply as inadequacy of income is still
fairly common in the literature on human deprivation.
However, this view has to capture the understanding that
income influences people’s life style and in the end
contributes to impoverishment of the lives they lead (Sen
2000). The perspectives on poverty inescapably surpass the
notion of welfare utility and encompass a broader range of
capabilities (Kahneman et al. 1997; Sen 1999; Wegner and
Pascual 2011), including the capabilities of pursuing
individual happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2002). Therefore,
increasing evidence and theory of plural dimensions of
human well being (Wegner and Pascual 2011) support the
perspective of multidimensional poverty in analysing local
perspectives on PES outcomes.
Our study on local perspectives on PES outcomes
Proceedings of the 22nd International Grasslands Congress 2013

showed that benefits were mostly non-financial, including
expanded social networks with external stakeholders,
knowledge and capacity of the community and small-scale
public infrastructure investments. Direct financial benefits
were limited. We presume the non-financial benefits
combined with recognition from the governments and
external stakeholders can well increase farmers’ commitment to the scheme. When financial payment is given, it is
important to adjust the value of new contracts so the
farmers can cover their true opportunity cost if the funds
from the buyer allow that. However, findings in other PES
sites in Asia revealed that most of the scheme cannot cover
farmers’ true opportunity cost because of limited funds of
buyers (Leimona et al. 2009).
Although the PES scheme did not drastically change
the livelihoods of participants, linkages with external
stakeholders were creating opportunities for participants to
diversify or capture greater value from their income
sources. Our case study showed that exposure to these
partners also increased the participants’ knowledge of
conservation, their skills to manage a farmers’ organization, and helped to build networks to improve their
businesses and implementation of the PES scheme. It also
highlights the need for awareness of the social dynamics
between participants and non-participants and design
benefit packages to minimize community level conflict.
Literature on PES mentions that conditional monetary PES
forming extrinsic motivation might crowd out intrinsic
motivation of people to do something right for societies
(Farley and Costanza 2010). Experiences from the
behavioural economics and psychology fields show that
even simple reminders to money made people perform
independently and socially insensitively. Further, experiments showed that people might commit more efforts in
exchange for no payment, such as in a social market where
reciprocity is expected, rather than they expend when they
receive low payment, such as underpayment in a monetary
market (Heyman and Ariely 2004; Ariely 2009).

Conclusions
This study aimed to contribute to the knowledge base on
how to balance efficiency and fairness of PES schemes in
Asia through analyses of several case studies. The main
conclusions are summarised below.
First, the empirical observations on emerging PESmechanisms in the Asian case studies indicate that the
performance of PES to achieve and balance efficiency and
fairness is strongly influenced by complex behaviour and
decision making at the individual level. These behaviours
at individual levels are not only limited to ES providers as
the main actors of PES but also beneficiaries, intermediaries, and supporters of PES (e.g. governments and
international agents). Motivations of stakeholders, their
perceptions, power relations and political interest towards
PES can further shape the design and implementation of
PES. A language of co-investment in environmental
stewardship may be more conducive to the type of respect,
mutual accountability and commitment to sustainable
development that is desired.
Second, non-financial payment has to be considered as
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an important incentive for ES providers. Such payments
have weaknesses, such as giving indirect benefits to ES
providers, which reduces the effectiveness of the payment
and can trigger free-riders and patronizing effects.
Nevertheless, in-kind reward is often the most feasible
transfer because the budget for PES from ES beneficiaries
is typically small and cannot cover the full opportunity
costs of the providers. Moreover, in-kind reward avoids
neglecting non-participants and aligns with social cohesiveness characterizing rural communities in most developing
countries.
Third, the application of multiple ecological knowledge
systems, i.e. local, public and scientific ecological knowledge can support the establishment of efficient and fair
PES schemes. Clarifying problems in the provision of ES
and recommending solutions at each spatial scale leads to
more realistic expectations of all stakeholders in implementing PES schemes. The roles of each actor are then
well-recognized and solutions based on local contexts
rather than standardized ones lead to mutual responsibility
among PES actors.
Fourth, the ES providers’ decision making process in
joining and implementing a PES contract is influenced by
social and institutional factors beyond monetary values.
However, rural communities are open to a market-based
approach, harnessing competitiveness among its participants as long as the design of the market-based instrument
is transparent and does not make them worse-off.
Fifth, evaluating an established PES using the
sustainable livelihood framework can provide more
complete insights on how PES makes actors involved better
or worse-off. It also can more fairly evaluate project
implementers, since a broader view of impacts are
captured. Our case in Indonesia suggests that the role of the
intermediary is very important and possibly dominant. An
honest and trusted intermediary is thus one of the key
factors to success of a PES scheme. It also highlights the
need for awareness of the social dynamics between
participants and non-participants and design benefit
packages to minimize community level conflict.
Finally, interdependency of fairness and efficiency is
the main consideration in designing and implementing a
PES scheme in developing countries. Neither fairness nor
efficiency alone should be the primary aim but an
intermediate PES that is fairly efficient and efficiently fair
may bridge the gap to the practical implementations of PES
on the ground.

Synthesis and recommendations: integrating PES
mechanisms into a wider concept of sustainable
development
As a relatively new concept, PES is facing challenges in its
process of being adopted as an innovation. The initial
theory of PES emphasized effectiveness of the scheme by
maximizing ES provision in relation to the monetary value
invested. In practice, PES often needs considering fairness
aspects and respect for traditional practices of local
communities. The difference between theory and implementation of PES schemes places this approach in
balancing fairness and efficiency in PES designs and
© 2013 Proceedings of the 22nd International Grassland Congress

implementations in a critical light.
Recognition of the range of PES approaches to provide
incentives for enhancement of ES is needed rather than
using “PES-like” terminology for partial matches with a
theoretical framework. Such terminology may not reflect an
optimal solution. A positive terminology for portraying
PES in practices may avoid frustrations from practitioners,
who might otherwise sense to be blamed for not meeting
theoretical expectations.
A broader view of efficiency can be achieved if all
potential win-win exchanges across actors and capital types
have been identified, negotiated and implemented. An ideal
PES scheme, in the perception of the external stakeholders,
can efficiently produce the desired effects or result in ES
increments with a minimum expenditure of time, effort,
skill or money across the negotiation and implementation
phases. An ideal PES scheme from a local perspective
provides substantial net benefits after all transaction and
opportunity costs have been accounted for. While the
minimum condition for local stakeholders is that the
scheme at least does not make them worse-off socially and
economically, and the minimum condition for external
stakeholders is to break-even with alternative options to
secure the ES they depend on. These different perceptions
and expectations on distribution of costs and benefits
among relevant stakeholders should be reflected at each
stage of PES development. A pro-poor PES scheme is
feasible under some conditions but not under others,
depending on the degree of space-time association (rather
than causal relationship) of poverty and environmental
degradation.
This study was limited to research sites that were
selected from a larger set of candidates of PES implementation sites in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam with
the main results coming from the Indonesian case studies.
Thus, these sites may not necessarily represent the broader
conditions of all PES schemes in Asia. Nevertheless,
methodologically, this study contributes to the introduction
of a nested approach and assessment of people’s perspective in identifying ES, PES supply costs, various types of ES
rewards and livelihood outcomes of such schemes, and
levelling expectations of all actors involved to avoid over
expectations and perverse incentives. The study supports
the argument to incorporate a more holistic livelihoods
perspective in PES schemes and to combine efforts through
moral persuasion, regulation and rewards or incentive
approaches to modify local-resource-use decisions in the
social, political and ecological realities of the Asian
landscape.
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